Harvey Rubin | Combating the risks

The newly released report, "World at Risk" from the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, offers a host of timely, specific recommendations to the Obama administration and should be required reading for all those engaged in improving our national security. The report contains chilling stories of stolen nuclear material, catastrophic biological attacks and sometimes even darkly-comical stories of attempts to sell contraband material.

In a headline-grabbing, and, to some, controversial conclusion, the Commission states that the "biological threat is greater than the nuclear (emphasis added)." Based on our extensive work in the field, I agree with this assessment. However, we must recognize that we presently have no metric or quantitative threat assessment tool to actually predict the likelihood of a biological attack or the results of such an attack if one were launched. The report reminds me of the story about the debate between some of the geniuses of the atomic age - Robert Oppenheimer, Edward Teller and Hans Bethe, who asked, "Could an atomic weapon ignite the atmosphere and extinguish life on earth?" Our scientific community must develop powerful new mathematical and scientific tools in order to engage and ultimately answer this question as it relates to the biological realm. This policy imperative is applicable not only to a deliberate biological attack but, more likely, a natural outbreak leading to a potentially global pandemic.

The report's description of the trials and tribulations of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) are well articulated if not surprising. The recommendation to the incoming Obama administration to "reject any efforts" to restart the BWC Protocol negotiations are balanced by a series of suggestions on how to reengage in the process. While this is clearly controversial, I agree with the Commission's recommendations here - as long as the balance is stressed, not just the "rejection" angle.

The Commission's urgent call for bio-surveillance and global disease surveillance networks is something we have advocated here at Penn, across the U.S. and abroad for several years, and I completely agree with the recommendations. However, there is a bit of naivete in the discussion of this issue in the Commission's report. One of the major problems is that there is no apparent recognition of the difficulty of coming to grips with reconciling who has the responsibility, jurisdiction, resources and expertise to act on the data once it is collected. There is also no discussion of the kind of data types that will be reported and who will actually analyze the data and translate it into actionable items. This may be too much detail to ask for in this blue-ribbon-panel report, but these details have been sticking points for years and must be resolved if we are to become a safer world.

Finally, the section on future needs is also vitally important and the call for building a national security workforce for the 21st century is one of the recommendations that should be accelerated and one that will have, if done properly, a lasting positive impact on national security. As for "next steps," methods and resources should be immediately identified and committed so that institutions of higher learning can be given incentives to engage in this endeavor. This is not another government bailout program but a matter of international security.

Harvey Rubin is a professor of Medicine, the chairman-elect of the Faculty Senate and the director of the Instiitute for Strategic Threat Analysis & Response.

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