Genetically modified scare tactics

Lethal viruses that attack specific ethnicities! Manmade bacteria that kill within hours! Deadly crops that poison farming fields -- and farmers!

These are tomorrow's outcomes of today's unregulated biological research industry, argues the British Medical Association. Released late last year, the BMA's Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity II report predicts a cadre of new weapons emerging from scientists' growing ability to artificially manipulate DNA, proteins and other fundamental building blocks of life. Such technology, though primarily used to develop novel disease therapies, genetically modified (GM) organisms and safer vaccine protocols, could do much harm if placed in the hands of, say, a dedicated terrorist organization or genocidal government intent on wreaking havoc.

In particular, the BMA fears the creation of biological agents capable of infecting specific populations based upon their genetic code. Insofar as Russians and Japanese, for example, differ according to subtle yet potentially exploitable genetic characteristics, it should be possible, so the BMA claims, to engineer a virus or bacterium to attack one group but not the other. Relieving the demands of bullets, machetes and concentration camps, systematic mass murder could become as simple as whooping up a coughing spell on a crowded bus.

To avert this future shock, the BMA recommends tighter constraints on biological research coupled with closer adherence to the original 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The BTWC (which the United States ratified 30 years ago) restricts the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, but it does permit defensive research. The BMA hopes for stricter regulation after the BTWC comes up for review in 2006; otherwise, according to the organization's chief ethicist Vivienne Nathanson, "If we wait too long, it will be virtually impossible to defend ourselves."

Of course, back in 1999, The Lancet noted that Nathanson and the BMA were equally scared of "toxic" GM foods, despite mounds of evidence to the contrary.

I was working in a South African bioethics department during the sub-Saharan famine of 2002 and saw firsthand the effects of this reckless scaremongering. Citing the BMA and other technology-wary groups, African leaders were content to let their people starve rather than eat "poisoned" GM food shipments from the United Nations (luckily the Luddites lost, and the food got to those who needed it most).

Now the BMA would again have us believe we are on the brink of a genetic Armageddon, warning that our "window of opportunity" for disciplining DNA is closing fast. Never mind that precise delivery or targeting of specific genes has proven exceedingly difficult, or that true examples of "designer" bacteria are few and far between, or that substantial genetic differences across peoples and races may in fact not exist. Just because genetic engineering is no cake-walk for the world's best and brightest scientists doesn't mean those whiz-kids over at al-Qaeda Labs can't do better, right?

Besides generating paranoia among an already slightly panicked public, doomsday predictions of scientists run amok detract attention from current, real threats for which science may hold promising solutions. For example, 20 tons of smallpox virus are missing from the former Soviet Union -- should we be investing in a safer, cheaper vaccine to mitigate possible attacks? Colum-bian drug lords have reportedly bred a pesticide-resistant coca plant -- should we be thinking about smarter ways of preventing cocaine distribution and use? Radiation fallout from a small, homemade dirty bomb could readily contaminate several city blocks -- should we be improving our WWII-era radiation treatment techniques?

Instead of depending on pandemic distrust and powerless international accords to keep the world safe, we might do better to further promote and reinforce a culture of social responsibility among the scientific community. British technophile Oliver Morton, writing in last week's New York Times, suggests that expanding the purview of the Hippocratic Oath might be in order, to ensure that the principle of primum non nocere ("first, do no harm") carries as much weight for biological researchers as it does medical professionals. Surely this makes more sense than dishing out science-fiction horror stories that do more to satisfy political agendas than secure personal safety.

Raising awareness about the course of scientific knowledge certainly remains paramount. After all, science, in its purest form, is a public endeavor. Crying wolf at each new turn of the double helix, however, confuses the theoretically possible with the practically probable and runs the risk of creating demons where none exist.

Jason Lott is a first-year student in the School of Medicine from Anniston, Ala. Whole Lotta Love appears on Mondays.

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