Arthur Waldron: Lessons to be untaught

The military operation launched yesterday by the United States is among the most challenging ever in our nation's history.ÿThe American people evidently understand that. Just after the attack on Pearl Harbor, in December 1941, George Gallup asked Americans whether they thought that the coming war would be "long and difficult." A majority answered "yes."

A Gallup organization poll after the Sept. 11 bombing asked the same question again -- and this time an even larger majority than in 1941 foresaw a long and difficult war.

The American people evidently grasp that we have very little choice in the matter. Osama bin Laden's network has scored perhaps the most stunning success in the entire history of terrorism and they are not about to abandon their campaign now. They are not going to stop. So we have to stop them.

That means systematically uprooting and destroying their terrorist network, which extends into dozens of countries, contains hundreds of brave, dedicated and able members, and which has had literally decades in which to burrow into our society and others. That task will not be easy.

The task is further complicated by the fact that the terrorists are passionate Muslims, and base themselves in Muslim societies. Their hope is that a ham-fisted and brutal American response will radicalize Muslim public opinion and ignite the "clash of civilizations" that Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington has written about. Such an outcome would of course be a disaster for all concerned -- for Afghanistan, for the United States, for the world. A few misplaced bombs or some catastrophic error like the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade could feed such an outcome.

Therefore, some observers favor doing little or nothing in response to the World Trade Center attack, lest we precipitate such a conflict. But that option has a fatal flaw. Unless we stop them, the terrorists will strike again -- and a second bloodletting in North America will make military retaliation inescapable for any U.S. government. So better to strike now, on our own terms, rather than later, when passions are running even higher.

Furthermore, the lesson that the U.S. will not respond effectively has already been taught repeatedly over the past decade -- in 1993 after the first World Trade Center attack, in 1996 after the Khobar Towers bombing, in 1998 after the embassy bombings and just last year after the attack on the USS Cole. The reputation for recklessness we have thus already created is one reason we are having difficulty finding local allies -- even though the people of the Middle East are more threatened by this sort of terrorism than we are.

That lesson must be untaught. That will take more than a few days of teaching. We are talking here about a course that may last as long as a college education -- and there is reason to expect success.

Personally, I have been greatly encouraged by the care and deliberation with which the Bush administration has approached what it understands is a supremely challenging diplomatic and military task. The president has spent days at Camp David with his top advisers, considering every aspect of the question. Secretary of State Colin Powell has worked with great subtlety and persuasiveness to shift the diplomatic balance -- most importantly with respect to Russia -- in our direction even before the shooting began.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld rightly rejected the initial Pentagon plans to wage a Desert Storm-style massive bombing campaign, and insisted instead on an operational plan that lays emphasis on intelligence and ground operations by special forces -- with airpower -- to take out enemy command control, radar, air bases and other purely military targets.

We can also assume that U.S. and British special forces have been active on the ground in Afghanistan since a day or two after the World Trade Centerÿattacks, working to locate targets, carry out intelligence and surveillance operations and liaise with local forces who share our opposition to Taliban's harboring of terrorists. American correspondents are already in northern Afghanistan. If they can be where they are, we can assume special forces are much deeper into the country.

I would therefore expect us to see unfold four distinct "wars" -- only one or two of which our news media will really be able to cover.

The air war, which I expect to be rather limited, is hard to miss and makes for good television. We can expect to see a lot of that. The ground war, involving special operations groups, should be invisible -- and will be, I think, until it really achieves something. Likewise the intelligence war, which is the third. On the diplomatic front, which finds Afghanistan without allies, the war will make news only if unrest breaks out, say, in Pakistan, or if a major player shifts against us, or if the war somehow spreads.

We can expect good news and bad news over the weeks and months ahead, as in any other war. No silver bullet exists: success will depend on tactical skill and sheer tenacity. But I believe that -- as was not the case in Vietnam -- we have a well-considered and robust strategy that integrates the diplomatic, social, and psychological as well as the military elements.

And I believe that as we gradually roll up the terrorists, squeezing them first out of Afghanistan, and then from other states harboring them, we will attract more overt allies than we have now, even as we create a situation in which we can address the genuine, festering issues -- poverty, ignorance, powerlessness, disease and oppression -- that afflict a region of the world long preoccupied by the plague of terrorism.

Arthur Waldron is the Lauder Professor of International Relations in the Department of History.

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